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Abstract :This paper set out to review the main theories  and empirical methods employed in 
selecting an appropriate exchange rate regime.In order to achieve this, the paper is organized  
as follows : Section 2 introduces the distinct classifications of exchange regimes(de jure 
exchange rate regimes versus the facto exchange rate regimes), and the different theoretical 
approaches which illustrate how an optimal exchange rate regime is determined . Despite their 
initial popularity, the theoretical considerations have not escaped criticism.Section 3 reviews 
the criticism of these theories.A conclusion is provided in Section 4. 
  Keywords : Exchange rate regime, the structural approach, credibility, flexibility, the bipolar 
view. 
1 - Introduction 
The literature on the selection of exchange rate regimes can be divided into three main 
groups : the structural approach, the trade-off between credibility and flexibility and 
the“bipolar view“ or “corner solution“. 
Classical literature refers to earlier studies which examined systematic differences between 
floating and fixed exchange rate regimes.The analysis in these studies is closely related to the 
literature on the choice between fixed and flexible regimes based firstly,on the  nature of the 
shocks generated by changes in trade flows and by a deterioration in terms of trade and 
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secondly, on the optimal currency area theory.This period was characterized by strict controls 
on capital flows, relatively stable exchange rates, low inflation,high growth and a rapid 
increase in trade.  
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system,the period of high inflation in the 1970s and 
1980s and the currencies crises that occured in the international financial market in the 1980s 
and 1990s led to a second significant developement in this literature.The relevance of the 
exchange rate regime for macroeconomic variables become a key issue in international 
macroeconomics and the choice between alternative regimes focused on the trade-off between 
credibility and flexibility. 
The succession of currency crises in the second half of the 1990s has led to a polarisation in 
the exchange rate regime  debate between what has come to be known as a “bipolar view“ or 
“corner solution“. 
2 - Classifications  and theories of exchange rate regimes 
This section examines the distinct classifications (de jure and de facto) of exchange rate 
regimes.Secondly theoretical literature is surveyed. 
 2-1-Classifying countries’exchange rate regime 
 2-1-1-IMF Exchange Rate Classification 
 Beyond the level of disaggregation of regimes is the system by which they are 
classified.From 1975 through 1998 the IMF classified members’ exchange rate arrangements 
under three main categories: pegged (against a single currency or a currency composite), 
limited flexibility vis-à-vis a single currency or group of currencies, and more flexible, 
including other managed and independently floating. This grouping was based on members’ 
official notifications or declaration to the IMF about their exchange rate policies and 
flexibility once becoming a member and after making any changes in their arrangements. A 
main shortcoming is that what countries are officially claiming to be doing (de jure) may 
differ largely from what they are actually pursuing (de facto). This would reduce the 
transparency of the undertaken exchange rate policy and make effective tracking, surveillance 
and analysis of the exchange rate regime evolution and performance for research and policy 
implications difficult and perhaps less accurate or biased.However, exchange rate regimes 
often differed from those that had been declared. Consequently, the de jure classification 
inaccurately characterized the de facto regime. Recognizing this problem, the IMF itself 
moved to a new de facto classification that combined information on the exchange rate and 
monetary policy framework and policy intentions with data on actual exchange rate and 
reserves movements. The existing IMF staff classification system has been modified to 
address these and other issues (see Appendix I table 1 for the new definitions). The revised 
classification has been published in the 2009 Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and in the IMF’s 2009 Annual Report. Specifically, the 
2009 AREAER include the revised classification at end-April 2009 and end-April 2008, and 
changes in the intervening period. 
2-1-2-Alternatives classifications 
While the new scheme adopted by the IMF in 1999 is a marked improvement over the former 
classification, the lack of historical database limits its usefulness for emperical analysis. It is 
possible to identify instances in which actual regimes differ from the stated 
arrangements.Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger(2000) find that of the 35 countries identified as 
free floats in 1998, 12(all of them emerging countries) could not be considered floaters.Calvo 
and Reinhart(2000) even conclude that most countries identify themeselves as floaters 
actually follow more rigid exchange arrangements.So, Bubula and Otker-Robe(2002) 
construct a monthly database on de facto regime for all member countries that extends the 
current classification back in time from the begining of 1990 to the end-2001.The sample 
period is limited but its analysis is interesting because it differs from the facto existing 
classification LYS for instance which ignore the IMF’s old official classification (Darne and 
Rippol 2004). Appendix II Table 2 provides a brief review of the classification scheme 
starting from the most rigid regime and becoming increasingly flexible within each system.  
 
2-2-Theoretical literature review :   
An extensive theoretical literature is available on the optimum choice of an exchange regime. 
The first approach is the structural approach based firstly  on the theory of the optimal 
currency area which focuses on a country’s economic structural characteristics, so as to 
determine whether it would be better off in terms of its ability to maintain external and 
internal balance through a fixed as compared to a flexible exchange arrangement,and 
secondly, on the  nature of the shocks generated by changes in trade flows and by a 
deterioration in terms of trade. 
The basic conclusion of these studies is that the optimal choice of an exchange regime 
depends on the nature and size of these shocks as well as the structure of the economy (Fisher 
(1977), Frenkel and Aizenman (1982)). These analyses show that if the disturbances are 
foreign and domestic real shocks such as shift in the demand of domestic goods, and even 
foreign nominal shocks, a greater degree of flexibility is preferable. But when the country 
experiences domestic nominal shocks, an exchange rate adjustment is not necessary. 
A second approach emphasizes the trade-off between credibility and flexibility(Giavazzi and 
Pagano,1998,Rodrick and Devarjan(1990).This approach assumes that the monetary authority 
maximize an utility function or minimizes a loss function that capture the trade-off between 
credibility and flexibility.This framework is applied to the case where monetary authorities 
must choose between fixed and flexible exchange rate regime.In selecting the regime,the 
authorities are assumed to compare the expected losses under each scenario.According to this 
argument, a flexible allows a country to have an independent moneatary policy providing the 
flexibility to accomodate domestic and foreign shocks but imparts a higher degree of 
credibility . 
A third approach is the bipolar view which holds that intermediate exchange rate regimes in 
countries open to international capital flows are not sustainable for extended periods, and that 
these countries should move away from the middle towards both extremes of the exchange 
rate spectrum (Eichengreen, 1994 ; Obstfield and Rogoff, 1995).  
2.2.1-The structural approach  
Subsequent discussions originating in the 1960s by Mundell (1961) focused on the optimal 
exchange regime to maintain external balance, while McKinnon (1963) emphasized 
maintenance of price stability. The main conclusion of that literature are that a small open 
economy is better served by a fixed exchange rate. However, the more diversified is a 
country’s production and export structure and the less geographically concentrated its trade, 
the stronger is the case for the flexible exchange rate regime. This arrangement is also 
attractive for the case of lower degrees of factor mobility, higher divergence of domestic 
inflation from that of its main trading partner and higher level of economic and financial 
development.This approach is known as  the conventionnal approach and was renewed in 
1980s. 
2.2.1.1-The conventional approach 
This approach choose an exchange regime based on the structural characteristics of the 
economy. It takes into account the structures of the economy and the objectives of the 
government. 
The Mundell-Fleming model holds that the choice of the exchange rate regime should depend 
on the type of shock hitting the economy (Lahiri, Singh, Vegh 2006). If shocks are 
predominantly of real origin, then  a flexible exchange rates are optimal. Instead, if shocks are 
mainly monetary, fixed (or, more generally, predetermined) exchange rates are optimal. 
Mundell (1963) extended Friedman’s analysis to a world of capital mobility.  
According to his analysis, the choice between fixed and floating depends on the sources of the 
shocks, whether real or nominal and the degree of capital mobility. In an open economy with 
capital mobility, a floating exchange rate provides insulation against real shocks, such as a 
change in the demand for exports or in the terms of trade, whereas a fixed exchange rate was 
desirable in the case of nominal shocks such as a shift in money demand. The Mundell 
Fleming model led to two important developments in the theory of exchange rate regime 
choice: the impossible trinity or the trilemma, and the optimal currency area. According to the 
trilemma, countries can only choose two of three possible outcomes: open capital markets, 
monetary independence and pegged exchange rates.  
More recently the trilemma has led to the bipolar view that with high capital mobility the only 
viable exchange rate regime choice is between super hard pegs (currency unions, dollarization 
or currency boards) and floating (Bordo 2003), which will be discussed in Section 2. 
2.2.1.1.1-Traditional Keynesian IS/LM model  
This model allow us to compare both fixed and flexible exchange rate regime in terms of the 
capacity of each one to stabilize the economy in front of different shocks. Economists 
distinguish between real shocks (emanating from the real side of the economy) and nominal 
shocks (emanating from the domestic monetary and financial system.Real shocks include 
changes in terms of trade (difference between exports and imports), variations in external 
demand for exports  and weather effects on agricultural output. 
2.2.1.1.1.1-Exchange regimes and monetary shocks : 
Initially the economy is in a stady state in the point E.The monetary shock reduces the money 
supply  and the LM curve will shift to the left (from LM1 to LM2 in figure b).This directly 
raises the interest rate (figure b :from i1 to i2) which reduces the aggregate demand( the 
economy will shift from Y1 to Y2 figure b).The decrease in the aggregate demand reduces the 
imports and decreases the domestic money supply against foreign currencies.This will lead to 
the balance of payment surplus and to a domestic currecy  appreciation  surplus. 
Under a fixed exchange regime : The central bank will sell the domestic currency against 
foreign currency at a predetermined rate implying an increase in money supply. This directly 
decrease the interest rate (figure a : from i2 to i1) and offsets  the initial recession by 
establishing the initial equilibrium (figure a : the point E)  
Under a flexible exchange regime : the domestic currecy  appreciation  will deteriorate the 
price-competitiveness, reduce the exports, increase the imports and  make the  recession 
worse (the economy will shift from Y1 to Y2 figure a).  
2.2.1.1.1.2-Exchange regimes and  real shocks :  
A real shock results in particular in a decrease in foreign demand for domestic 
goods.Consequently, domestic exports decrease, domestic exchange reserves decrease and the 
exchange rate depreciates. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank stands ready to buy the domestic 
currency at the predermined rate .The central bank shifts the LM curve to keep the exchange 
rate at its preannounced rate  (from LM1 to LM2 in figure b), so the exchange reserves 
decrease ,the money supply decrease and the increase in the interest rate (figure a :from i1 to 
i2)  will make the initial recession worse ( the economy will shift from Y1 to Y2 figure b).  
Under a flexible exchange rate regime : the central bank will do nothing to prevent the 
depreciation, so this depreciation would cause exports to increase and would improve 
automatically the trade balance (because the lower the domestic  exchange rate, the more of 
domestic goods the foreigners will purchase).  
The increase of the foreign demand for  domestic goods offsets the initial recession which 
comes from the  decrease in foreign demand. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime the foreign recession is transmitted to the domestic 
economy and its effects are amplified by the money supply contraction (the shift from LM1 to 
LM2 figure b), as a consequence of the exchange rate parity that the central bank has to 
maintain under a fixed exchange rate regime.However, the flexible exchange rate regime 
isolates the economy from the external shocks (by the depreciation mecanism). 
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2.2.1.1.2-The extent of the Mundell-Fleming model : 
2.2.1.1.2.1-The exchange regime and the optimal macroeconomic stabilisation 
A large literature focused on how the choice of an exchange regime will affect the stability of 
the economy. While the methodology and the emphasis of the various theoretical argument 
differ, the common thread that runs through all is the appropriate exchange rate system will 
differ with the nature of the disturbance to the economy. 
Aizenman and Frankel(1981) maitain that the optimal exchange regime  depends on the 
characteristics of the shocks  and the composition of the production. 
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negative relationship between i and Y. The LM curve summarizes all the combinations of income and interest 
rates that equate money demand and money supply. We can express the demand for money, as a function of the 
interest rate i, income Y, and the price level P, Money Demand= Md (P, Y, i). When interest rates (i) are high, 
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When Y is high the demand for money is high, richer people buy more goods and are likely to hold more money. 
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market is in equilibrium, money supply = money demand so Ms = Md (P, Y, i).The LM curve summarizes all 
combinations of income and interest rates that equate money demand and money supply. The LM curve is an 
upward sloping relationship between i and Y.We can explain the upward sloping LM curve as follows: Let’s 
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suppose there is an increase in income. The increase in income causes the demand for money to increase. 
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For the first criterion, they compute the variance of both real and monetary shocks. When the 
ratio between the variances of the monetary shock and the real shock approaches infinity 
(either because the former approaches infinity or because the latter approaches zero) the 
optimal exchange rate system is that of freely flexible rates. Likewise, when the same ratio 
approaches zero (either because the variance of the effective monetary shock approaches zero 
or because the variance of the real shock approaches infinity), the optimal exchange rate 
system is that of fixed rates(Aizenman and Frenkel 1981).  High variance of real shocks, tends 
to raise the desirability of greater fixity of exchange rates. However,  the desirability of 
exchange rate flexibility increases the larger are the variances of the shocks to the demand for 
money, to the supply of money, to foreign prices and to purchasing power parities (Aizenman 
and Frenkel 1981).Small economies, and in particular developing countries, tend to have 
concentrated production patterns and thus, are likely to have higher variance of real shocks 
than more diversified economie. Consequently, these economies will find it optimal to have 
greater fixity of exchange rates (Aizenman and Frenkel 1981). 
Concerning the second criterion(the composition of the production), when the authors  
extended the analysis to an economy which produces traded and non-traded goods it was 
shown that the desirability of exchange rate flexibility diminishes the higher is the share of 
non-traded goods relative to traded goods and the lower are the elasticities of demand and 
supply of the two goods.  
The substantive differences existing among the various studies are, to a certain extent, due to 
different criteria used for exchange system choice.It is not surpring that one’s beliefs with 
regard to the effect of exogenous shocks on exchange system choice will be sensitive to the 
objective function used.For instance, Fisher (1977) and Frenkel and Aizenman(1981) focus on 
the minimization of real consumption shocks and derive the result that the greater the 
domestic money shocks,the more likely is a float.Alternatively,Flood(1979) and 
Aizenman(1983),with an objective of minimizing domestic price shocks,conclude that the 
greater the domestic money shocks, the more preferred is a fixed exchange rate (Melvin 
1985). 
2.2.1.1.2.2-The Renewal : Optimum currency area theory(OCA)  
Some papers have mainly focused on cross section analysis in order to learn the determinants 
of the exchange rate regime.  These papers use structural characteristics of the economy as 
well as economic shocks to explain the choice of the exchange rate regime.  For instance, 
Bosco (1987) uses binomial, ordered and multinomial logit regressions to test the   
determinants of the exchange rate regime in developing countries.  He concludes that a fixed 
exchange rate is more likely when the country is more open and domestic inflation is not far 
from world inflation.  Similarly, Savvides (1990) uses a model to simultaneously determine 
real exchange rate variability and the choice of exchange rate regime.  He argues that 
countries with real exchange rate variability tend to opt for flexible exchange rate 
arrangements, while greater capital mobility is associated with fixed exchange rate regimes. 
The econometric specification requires the definition of the probabilities to choose one of the 
alternatives.In the model of Klein and Marion(1994), the dependent variable equals zero in 
any month when the peg is in effect and equals one in the month that the spell ends. Variables 
from month are used to determine the probability of exit in month t+1using logit analysis. In 
this framework, the probability of maintaining the peg up until month t+1, that is =0, and 
the probability of a devaluation in month t+1, that is =1depend upon the vector of 
variables  as follows: 
)= +   
This equation demonstrates that the elements of the vector γ1 represent the partial elasticity of 
the likelihood of a devaluation with respect to the vector of variables Xt. 
Klein and Marion(1994) were concerned by the  estimation of the determinants of the 
duration of a fixed exchange rate.They used the logit model for estimating the monthly 
probability of leaving an exchange-rate peg, particularly for developing countries. Using a 
logit model which focuses on the roles of structure, misalignment and political costs of 
exchange-rate changes can provide new insights into the factors that influence the decision to 
maintain the peg month by month. Several general conclusions are worm reemphasizing. 
First, when a government is concerned about its country's competitive position, its decision 
about how long to stay on a peg will be   influenced not only by the degree of real exchange  
misalignment but also by the structure of the economy. Structure affects the cost of a given 
misalignment. Openness and trade concentration, which have long been thought to influence 
the choice of exchange-rate regime, influence its duration as well, they  found  that greater 
openness  reduces the monthly probability of leaving a peg in the  sample of Latin American 
pegs over the 1957-1990 period. Increased trade concentration with the trading partner to 
whom the country is pegged (the United States) increases the monthly probability of exiting a 
peg, though this result is not robust across all specifications and samples. Political factors are 
also relevant .The likelihood of a devaluation increases immediately after a regular or 
irregular executive transfer (Klein and Marion(1994)). 
In general, all of the empirical papers use cross section data, with the clear disadvantage that 
they cannot capture the recent dynamics of the economy at the moment when the regime 
choice is made. 
 Olivia and Leon(1999), examine the determinants of the exchange rate regime within a time 
series approach, in order to overcome limitations of the cross-section approach.  Use of the 
former is based upon the assumption that the choice of a regime is better explained by the past 
and present evolution of the economy rather than by certain conditions at a given moment.  
Because of the decision for changing the exchange rate regime is affected by large discrete 
costs associated with the change, policy makers would not change the exchange regime until 
key variables got far enough out of line so that the long term benefits would exceed the cost 
of the switch. This would imply some inertia in regimes that will be better captured by a time 
series analysis.  By using a time series approach, we regard the regime choice as a medium 
term decision that marginally depends on short span indicators.  A multinomial qualitative 
response model will be used, with dependent variable yt, such that:   
Yt = 0   if the country has a fixed exchange rate regime at time t ; 
Yt = 1   if the country has a managed or crawling peg regime at time t ; 
Yt = 2   if the country has a flexible exchange rate regime at time t. 
According to the literature, some of the variables that affect the decision of a specific 
exchange rate system are monetary shocks, Real shocks, inflation differential, foreign reserves 
constraints and openness (Olivia and Leon(1999)). 
To estimate the model monthly data from the period January-1974 to July-1993 is used.  The 
dependent variable takes the value 0 within July-1979 and May-1982, the period when the 
exchange rate was fixed at 39 pesos per dollar.  Since August-1985 to the present, the 
exchange rate in Chile was determined with a band system  where the exchange rate freely 
floated within the bands and the Central Bank intervenes when the rate approaches the limits 
of the band. The bands have broaden to achieve ± 10percent the referential rate since 1992.  In 
this case, the dependent variable takes the value 2 through out this period.  Finally, it equals 1 
during the rest of the months, characterized by a crawling peg system.  The authors conclude 
that the bigger the inflation differential, the greater the probability of a less flexible exchange 
rate regime.  This evidences the fact that Chile used the exchange rate with price stabilization 
purposes when domestic inflation was relatively high with respect to world inflation. When 
comparing a fixed with a flexible regime, the estimation exhibits a direct relationship between 
openness and a fixed regime, showing that the regime was used to easily channel abroad 
domestic shocks.  However, if the decision is between crawling peg and the band regime, it is 
more likely to opt for a more flexible system in order to augment the insulating properties of 
the exchange rate regime.  The effect of the disturbances show unambiguous results which 
ever the choice is. It is more likely to choose a fixed arrangement when domestic real shocks 
are important. After 1988 a more flexible exchange rate regime seems to have acted as an 
efficient instrument to control the monetary shocks, while the inflation was managed by strict 
fiscal discipline. 
 Based on these different  models, we can conclude that the choice of an exchange rate regime 
depends on the authorities’ economic objectives, the structural characteristics of the economy, 
and the nature of shocks to the economy. Therefore, various considerations could have 
different implications for adopting fixed or flexible exchange rates. The fact that different 
criteria may suggest different regimes is also in line with the empirical findings in the 
literature. Furthermore, the importance of each consideration tends to change over time.The 
main analytical considerations that have been identified in the literature for the choice of an 
exchange rate include the following: 
Openness of the economy and economic integration. The more open the economy to trade 
and the greater the degree of integration of the economy’s trade with its partners, the stronger 
is the case for a fixed exchange rate as exchange rate variability may discourage trade and 
investment. A fixed exchange rate is viewed as a means to 
promote trade through reductions in exchange rate variability and the associated transaction 
costs (IMF 2005). 
Financial integration. Advantages of fixed exchange rates decline as the economy’s 
integration to global financial markets increases. Countries with open capital accounts, greater 
exposure to international capital flows, and fixed exchange rates have been more prone to 
crises. In theory, financial integration is not compatible with a fixed exchange rate (IMF 
2005).  
Economic diversification. Countries whose production and exports are not diversified will be 
more vulnerable to shocks and require exchange rate flexibility to facilitate adjustment to 
shocks. This is because an exchange rate can get seriously misaligned under a peg. However, 
a diversified economy may actually be in a better 
position to float since the exchange rate is likely to be more stable were it to float in such a 
context(IMF 2005). 
Real versus nominal shocks. In countries where monetary shocks are more important than 
real shocks, a fixed exchange rate will be more effective in stabilizing output. In these cases, a 
high degree of capital mobility makes the fixed exchange rate more effective. In countries, 
where real shocks are more important, a fixed exchange rate provides a better insulation of 
output if capital mobility is low. However, under a fixed exchange rate, high capital mobility 
will amplify the destabilizing effects of a real shock. Thus, in countries where real shocks are 
more important and capital mobility is high, flexible exchange rates will be preferable(IMF 
2005). 
Achieving credibility. In advanced economies, growth has benefited from flexible exchange 
rate regimes in environments where central banks had credibility in maintaining price stability 
and the financial sector infrastructure was strong. 
In contrast, developing countries with institutional weaknesses and difficulties in maintaining 
low inflation may gain credibility through pegging their exchange rates. Thus, countries with 
high inflation, and underdeveloped financial sectors, could benefit from pegging their 
exchange rates (IMF 2005). 
 
 
2.2.2-The The  trade-off  between credibility and flexibility approach  
The environnement of high inflation in many countries of the 1970s and during 1980s 
introduced a new approach to exchange rate selection, focused on the transmission of inflation 
between countries and the use of exchange rate policies to achieve low inflation rates. 
Building on the theory developed  by Barro and Gordon(1983 a,b) on monetary policy 
credibility,some of the literature of the 1980s developed the idea that a fixed exchange rate 
could help import credibility of  low inflation policies from a foreign central bank .Numerous 
authors emphasised the credibility gains adopting a peg arrangement.The main argument in 
favour of fixed rates is their ability to induce discipline and make the monetary policy more 
credible because the adoption of lax monetary(and fiscal) policies would eventually lead to an 
exhausion of reserves and the  collapse of the fixed exchange rate system implying a big 
political cost for policy makers. 
According to this argument, a flexible  regime allows a country to have an independent 
monetary policy providing the flexibility to accommodate domestic and foreign shocks, while 
a fixed exchange rate regime reduces the degree of flexibility to accommodate such shocks 
but imports a higher degree of credibility. Without central bank credibility,private agents will 
continue to expect a high inflation rate, and this will increase the cost of any attempt to 
stabilize domestic prices.Establishing credibility means convincing the public that the central 
bank will not deviate from its exchange rate or money supply target in order to secure short 
term benefits associated with surprise inflation(Agénor 1994). 
Underlying every monetary regime is the search for an equilibrium between two often 
conflicting requirements: on the one hand, the credibility of the management of the currency, 
which is vital for maintaining confidence in the value of the monetary yardstick.On the other, 
the flexibility needed to attenuate the impact on the economy of unexpected shocks, of major 
events that are independent of the action of the monetary authorities (Fazio 1998). 
In their model, Giavazzi and Pagano(1988) maintain that the policy-makers trade off two 
costs : a dislike of inflation and the knowledge that it is making the economy less competitive. 
In this paper, They investigate the conditions under which the gains in credibility by applying 
the inflation discipline rule outweight the implied losses. They compute the welfare gains in 
terms of competitiveness and price stability inside and outside this disciplinary rule.  
Rodrick and Devarjan(1990) focused on the CFA zone .The zone has maintained a fixed 
parity with the french franc throughout its history. The relative performance of zone members 
vis-a-vis their african counterparts illustrates the tradeoffs involved. On the one hand, zone 
members enjoyed lower inflation thanks to the fixed exchange rate regime. On the other hand, 
they have apparently been unable to adjust their economies to the large terms of trade shocks 
of the l980s and have experienced greater variability in output. One reason, is their inability to 
use nominal exchange rate as an instrument of adjustment.The experience of the CFA zone 
illustrates the main trade off  involved in the choice of exchange rate regimes.By committing 
themselves to a fixed-rate regime, these countries could anchor their price levels and maintain 
inflation close to the rate experienced by the country whose currency serves as the peg. 
However, by doing so they lost the ability to adjust to terms of trade shocks. Had they 
selected a flexible-rate regime, they would have been able to limit the damage done to the real 
economy by the ups and down in the world prices of their main imports and exports.That in 
turn, would have come at the expense of a higher rate of inflation, as domestic wage and price 
setters would have lacked the discipline, and domestic monetary authorities the credibility 
provided by an irrevocably fixed exchange rate .The policymaker is interested in maximizing 
an objective function in which both a nominal and a real variable play a role. They cast the 
model in terms of growth and inflation. They express the objective function in quadratic-loss 
form: 
 (1) 
Where W denotes welfare, π  is inflation, Y is the growth rate, ϕ is the weight attached by the 
authorities to the real target relative to the nominal one, and π* Y* are the policy maker's 
targets for inflation and growth, respectively. A welfare maximum is attained when inflation 
and growth hit their target levels : (π= π* and Y=Y*). 
The equilibrium level of growth is determined by two variables, the change in the real 
exchange rate and the terms of trade: 
Y= +α ( ) (2) 
Where  is the (exogenously given) "natural rate of growth, e and p are (log differences in) 
the exchange rate and the home-goods price, respectively, γ is the (log) terms of trade, and 
is the mean level of the (log) terms of trade. An equation like (2) follows from expressing 
the level of output as a function of the level of the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. 
 The fixed exchange-rate regime does better on the inflation front (on average), while the 
flexible-rate regime does better on the real side of the economy by reducing the fluctuations in 
growth rate. The next step is to derive an explicit cost-benefit criterion for determining which 
of the two regimes provides a higher level of expected welfare.In other words, they have 
attempted to measure the welfare costs arising from the inability to adjust the exchange rate, 
and to pit these costs against the benefits of lower inflation.Their calculations suggest that 
fixed exchange rate have been on the whole a bad bargain for the CFA member countries.For 
most of the CFA members, a lower inflation benefits do not appear to have been large enough 
to offset the costs on the output side (Rodrick and Devarjan(1990)) 
2.2.3-The bipolar view 1
The general trend towards large capital mobility has shifted attention on the implications of 
capital movements in the choice of exchange rate regimes.The recent spate of emerging 
market crises in the 1990’s (Mexico in 1994, East Asia in1997, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 
1999, Turkey and Argentina in 2001), has led to attention to the plight of these countries who 
have opened up their financial markets. Most of the  countries hit by crises had combinated 
some form of intermediate exchange rates with high capital mobility (hausmann et al. 
1999).Those combinations are exposed to speculative attacks resulting from fundamental 
policy inconsistencies (Krugman, 1979).  
The corners hypothesis holds that intermediate exchange rate regime are vanishing or should. 
The seeming frequency with which soft pegs have been broken has led to the growing belief 
that developing economies must adopt corner solutions to exchange rates arrangements.In 
other words, it is argued that the only viable exchange rate option for such economies is 
flexibility, on the one hand, or credible pegging, on the other. A ‘’credible peg’’ or ‘’super 
fix ‘’ in turn refers to one of three possibilities: a currency board arrangement, effectively 
abandoning the domestic currency for a new currency (monetary union), or using 
domestically the currency of another country (dollarisation or eurorisation). This 
recommendation has come to be referred to as ”the vanishing intermediate regime“. In view 
of this, there has been growing enthusiasm for the irrevocably fixed corner solution. 
Over the course of the 1990s,the bipolar view become a new orthodoxy in the selection of an 
exchange rate regime.Some emperical research points out that since the early 1990s there has 
been a continuous fall in the number of countries that maintain some type of intermediate 
exchange rate regime, and a continuing rise in the number of countries with both pure floating 
rates and hard pegs.This polarisation has led some authors to conclude that intermediate 
exchange rate regimes in countries open to international capital flows are not sustainable for 
extended periods, and that these countries should move away from the middle towards both 
extremes of the exchange rate spectrum (Eichengreen,1994 ;Obstfield and Rogoff,1995). 
2-A critical review of the theoretical literature 
In this section, we critically review the theoretical and the emperical literature on exchange 
regime that focuses on emerging economies. 
2-1-The limits of the structural approach : 
The structural approach has been criticised for the inconsistency of the determinants of the 
exchange rate regime and for not capturing important real world features of the decision for 
developing countries. 
2-1-1-Herding and the shifting determinants of exchange rate regime choice in the 
structural approach  
Russel(2012) says that it is difficult to pin down the factors that determine states choice of 
exchange rate regime because those very factors present a moving target. Many scholars have 
taken on the same question: what are the determinants of exchange rate regime choice? But as 
a group they have been unable to identify a stable answer. The reason for this is that the 
factors that best predict exchange rate regime vary dramatically across time. An explanation 
for this variation is offered: “rational herding“, or “information cascades“, can explain why 
one factor becomes prominent for a period of time then suddenly drops off and is replaced by 
a better predictor. 
There is clear diversity over time among the factors that relate to exchange rate regime 
choice. In some years inflation appears to be the best predictor of exchange rate regime 
choice. In other years inflation seems not to matter at all while foreign currency reserves, 
economic growth or capital account openness seem to be better predictors.  “Herding“, or 
‘information cascades’, among governments offer significant insights as to why these factors 
shift. Herding occurs when states have some private information about the best option to 
choose, but rather than act on that information they follow the paths already chosen by those 
who went before. When actors rely upon the information revealed by those they observe 
rather than their own private information, this is referred to as an “information cascade“.  
Ultimately, the factors that are related to exchange rate regime choice are not stable.As one 
factor becomes important for predicting exchange rate regime choice, another fades away. 
Variables rise and fall in importance suddenly and often. This accounts for why the literature 
on exchange rate regimes is so inconsistent. 
2.1.2-Considerations not adequately covered by the structural approch  
The standard approach to the analysis of choice of exchange rate regime does not capture 
important real world features of the decision for developing countries for several reasons. 
First, the theoretical models discussed above often assume that the critical difference between 
fixed and more flexible regimes is that nominal exchange rates can not be adjusted under a 
fixed regime. In fact, countries with fixed exchange rates typically do maintain the option of 
nominal adjustments. Indeed, the 1980s saw major adjustments of the nominal values of many 
of the LAC (Latin America and Caribbean) countries' currencies that maintained a fixed 
regime. 
Second, the traditional model does not incorporate the political economy of exchange rate 
adjustments. The central point here is that it may be more politically costly to adjust a fixed 
exchange rate than to undertake a similar nominal adjustment to an exchange rate that is 
managed, because the latter is much easier to disguise. 
Third, traditional models do not incorporate  research findings and assessments of country 
experiences regarding the appropriate exchange rate regime for a small open economy. 
During the 1970s, there seemed to be a pervasive view that a small country with poorly 
developed financial markets should peg to its main trading partner. One concern was that the 
market for its currency would be thin, creating a volatile exchange rate that would be 
disruptive for economic activity. As noted by Quirk (1994), in his discussion of exchange rate 
regimes in developing countries,  “Prior to the 1980s, it was widely believed that operating a 
competitive floating exchange rate regime required a level of institutional development these 
countries did not possess."  
There appears to be widespread agreement that independent floating is either infeasible for 
most developing countries, due to factors such as limited capital markets, restrictions on 
capital flows, thin foreign exchange markets and a prevalence of real shocks that should be 
financed from the reserves (Quirk 1994).  
Since the mid 1980s, however, this view appears to have all but disappeared. Quirk (1994) 
observes that the IMF's 1987 review of the early experience with floating exchange regimes 
concluded that these systems could be operated satisfactorily, even by developing countries 
with a wide range of structures. Many developing economies were encouraged to abandon 
fixed rates during the 1980s. In fact, many countries that adopted more flexible regimes 
during since 1985-especially freely floating ones -appear to have done so in the context of an 
IMF program (Collins 1996). 
 
2.2-The limits of the trade-off approach 
The limits of the trade-off approach are related first to the binary characterization : “pegged“ 
and “flexible captured by the emperical studies and second to the choice of the criterion of 
optimality. 
2.2.1-The binary fashion pegged/flexible 
The modern literature on exchange rate regimes has emphasized the existence of important 
trade-offs between credibility and flexibility (Agénor 1994Giavazzi and Pagano 1988, Rodrik 
and Devarjan1990).  In doing this, however, most theoretical analyses have considered two 
highly simplified extreme cases: a fully flexible (or floating) exchange rate with minimal 
central bank intervention, and  an irrevocably (and credibly) fixed nominal exchange rate. 
According to this bipolar characterization, a flexible exchange rate regime allows a country to 
have an independent monetary policy, providing the economy with flexibility to 
accommodate domestic and foreign shocks, including changes in external terms of trade and 
interest rates.   
Alternatively, fixed exchange rates reduce the degree of flexibility of the system but impart 
(in theory) a higher degree of credibility to policy making.   
The majority of emperical studies consider  two extreme cases : “pegged“ and 
“flexible“.According to this approach, purely floating and fixed systems are, the two only 
possible options a country can choose. But in reality, there are many layers between these two 
extremes which should be covered by the analysis. 
2.2.2- The choice of the criterion of optimality. 
Aghevli,Kan et Montiel(1991) observe that the first issue that needs to be addressed in the 
trade-off approach is the criterion of optimality.In principle, a standard welfare-related 
criterion should be specified and applied.In practice, however,the trade-off analysis has 
focused on the relatively narrow criterion of macroeconomic stability defined in terms of 
minimizing the variance of real output,the price level, or real consumption in face of random 
transitory shocks.The problem with specifying policy objectives in such a fashion is that 
choosing to stabilize any single macroeconomic variable runs the risk of destabilizing some 
other variable that may also seem relevant to the general welfare.Such trade-offs could be 
made only by using an explicit welfare,but no such comprehensive analysis has  as yet been 
undertaken.The criterion most commonly adopted in the literature has been the stability of  
real output.The concrete question would in this case be how best to manage the exchange rate 
so as to minimize the variance of real output around its full capacity level in the face of 
random shocks arising from diverse external and domestic sources. 
2.3-The criticizm of the corner hypothesis 
Despite its initial popularity, the corner hypothesis has not escaped criticism. Various case 
studies show that transitions occur not just away from an intermediate regime, but also toward 
it. 
2.3.1-Lack of theoretical foundations for the corners hypothesis : 
This hypothesis lacks analytical foundations. Fränkel Schmukler et Serven(2000) checked 
three of the arguments presented in theoretical literature to support this hypothesis : 
 (1) the  impossible trinity, (2) unhedged liabilities and (3) the  aversion for abandonning the 
exchange regime. 
1-The corners hypothesis appears to be a corollary to the principe of the impossible 
trinity.That principle says that a country must give up one of the three goals :exchange rate 
stability,monetary independence and financial market integration.It cannot have all three 
simultaneously.If one adds the observation that financial markets are steadily becoming more 
and more integrated internationaly, that forces the choice down to giving up on exchange rate 
stability or giving up on monetary independence2.Nevertheless,the policy trilemma, does not 
mean that the  monetary authorities are obliged to liberalize their  capital account Rodrik 
(1998).  
We can imagine cases where the judicious application of capital controls could have 
prevented a crisis or greatly reduced its magnitude.Thailand and Indonesia would have been 
far better off restricting borrowing from abroad instead of encouraging it.  Korea might just 
have avoided a run on its reserves if controls on short-term borrowing had kept its short-term 
exposure to foreign banks, say, at 30 percent, rather than 70 percent of its liabilities. 
Enshrining capital account convertibility in the IMF’s articles of agreement is an idea whose 
time has not yet come.  We have no evidence that it will solve any of these problems, and 
some reason to think that it may make them worse. 
2-Another justification that has been offered is that when a government establishes any sort of 
exchange rate target, as did the East Asian countries,its banks and firms foolishly 
understimate the possibility of a future break in the currency value.As a result, they incure 
large unhedged dollar liabilities abraod.When a devaluation occurs,their domestic currency 
revenues are inadequate for servicing their debts, and so they go bankrupt,with devastating 
consequences for the economy.This argument, has some weaknesses.First,it appears to 
depend on irrationality on the part of banks and firms.Second,it appears to imply that a 
country would be better off by gratuitously introducing extra noise into the exchange rate, to 
deter borrowers from incurring unhedged dollar liabilities.This seems unlikely to be 
right.Third,is the point emphasized by Ricardo Hausman(1999) :foreigners are unwilling to 
take open positions in the currencies of emerging market countries.Thus the admonition to 
avoid borrowing in dollars is to some extent on admonition to avoid borrowing at all.It may 
well be that this is the right road to go down, that exchange rate volatiliy is a way to put some 
sand in the wheels of the excessive capital movements,and that a lower volume  of total debt 
is a good outcome.But if this is the argument, the proponents should be explicit about it.In any 
case, it seems doubtful that this argument could be captured by conventional models. 
3-A third possible justification is that governments that adopt an exchange rate target, and 
sometimes later experience a major reversal of capital inflows, tend to wait too late 
abandoning the target.As of 1998,we though we had learned that the thing in emerging 
markets governments can do to minimize the eventual pain from a currency crisis is to try to 
devaluate early enough.Mexico, Thailande and Korea made mistake of waiting too long until 
reserves run very low, so that by the time of the devaluation there was no good way out, no 
combination of interest rate that would simultaneously satisfy the financing constraint 
externally and prevent recession domestically.But existing from an exchange rate target can 
be difficult politically.The lesson is drawn that, to avoid this diffuclty, governments should 
either adopt a rigid institutional fixed commitment or, if not prepared to do that, abandon the 
peg early. 
All these arguments so far lack analytic foundation. Fränkel Schmukler et Serven (2000) offer 
one possible theoretical rationale, a contribution to the list of arguments against intermediate 
regimes :a lack of verifiability needed for credibility.Central banks announce intermediate 
targets such as exchange rates, so that the public can judge from observed data whether they 
are following the policy announced.  Fränkel Schmukler et Serven (2000) hold that simple 
regimes are more verifiable by market participants than complicated ones.Of the various 
intermediate regimes(managed float,peg with escape clause, ect.), they focus on  basket pegs, 
whith bands.Statistically, it takes a long span of data to distinguish such a regime from a 
floating exchange rate.They applied the econometrics to the example of Chile by performing 
Monte Carlo simulations.The amount of data required to verify the declared regime may 
exceed the length of time during which the regime is maintained.The amount of information 
necessarely increases with the complexity of the regime including the width of the band and 
the number of currencies in the basket Fränkel Schmukler et Serven (2000). 
Despite these probems, the developing countries have continued to maintain the intermediate 
regimes. 
2-3-2-Verifying  the hollowing out  hypothesis  
2.3.2.1-The hollowing out hypothesis and  theoretical results 
Bordo(2003) holds that the emergers face special problems which make this simple 
dichotomy (hard pegs-free float) a bit more difficult than is posed. First in the case of hard 
pegs such as currency boards (or dollarization), currency crises are ruled out (to the extent the 
currency board is followed) but banking crises are still possible and without a monetary 
authority they cannot be contained (Chang and Velasco 2001). Related to the inability to act 
as lender of last resort is the inability to have the monetary policy flexibility to offset external 
real shocks. Moreover establishing a currency board or going the next step and dollarizing 
works best if the currency picked for the peg is of a country that has extensive trade with the 
emerger and has a history of monetary stability.  Second is the so called problem of  ‘Original 
Sin’ (Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999). Because many emerging countries are financially 
underdeveloped and they may have had a history of high inflation and fiscal laxity, they are 
not able to either borrow in terms of their own currencies long-term or to borrow externally 
except in terms of foreign currencies such as the dollar. This according to Eichengreen and 
Hausmann(1999), exposes them to the serious problems of both maturity and currency 
mismatches. In the face of a currency crisis a devaluation can lead to serious balance sheet 
problems, widespread bankruptcies and debt defaults. This was the case in East Asia in the 
1990’s and also when Argentina exited from its currency board in 2001. The ‘Original Sin’ 
creates problems for emergers who float and even those who adopt hard pegs.  
 A third problem for emergers that float is that devaluations may have no effect on the real 
economy in the face of widespread indexation or a history of high inflation. Thus there may 
be very high pass through from the exchange rate to the price level or in the case of original 
sin, as mentioned above, devaluing may actually be contractionary. 
These problems suggest that intermediate arrangements may still have a role to play for such 
countries. Also it is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, middle and large 
emerging countries who have the potential and are moving in the direction of  the policies of 
the advanced countries and adopting domestic nominal  anchors such as inflation targeting 
cum independent central banks, and on the other hand small very open emergers who may 
fare best with currency unions Bordo 2003)3.   
2.3.2.2-The hollowing out hypothesis and  emperical results 
Fisher(2001) documented the case for the hollowing out hypothesis or the bipolar view by 
examining the evolution of exchange rate regimes in a large sample of countries in the period 
between 1991 to 1999.His work indicates that the number of emerging market countries with 
intermediate regimes declined from 21 countries(64%) in 1991 to 14 countries(42%) in 
1999,but there is no evidence to suggest that the intermediate exchange rate regime 
disappearing.On the other hand, Bubula and Otker(2002) using a monthly database on IMF de 
facto classifications find that intermediate regime have been more prevalent than suggested by 
the jure classification in the period between 1990-2001. 
The study developed  by Rogoff et al(2003) shows that intermediate regime have been and 
continue to be considerably more prevalent during the period 1940-2001 (Figure 1). 
Based on the natural classification Rogoff et al(2003) indicate that there has been 
no“hollowing of the middle“.While a few emerging markets indeed moved to de facto hard 
pegs (Argentine and Malaysia) or free floats (Indonesia, Korea and South Africa), just as 
many transioned from freely falling to intermediate regimes(Brazil,Peru, Poland,Russia and 
Venezuela).As a result,the middle remained as large as it was a decade 
ago.Moreover,transitions since 1990 to de facto pegs among emerging markets have been 
more in the“soft“(China,Egypt,Jordan and Peru) rather than the hard category .  
 
  
 
Figure 1 : The evolution of exchange regime in emerging markets 1940-2001 
 
Source : Rogoff et al(2003)                  
 
 
Conclusion 
This study has attempted to shed new light on some areas of research in the exchange regime 
choice by analyzing over 40 years of empirical work. Three topics that gained  considerable 
attention in the past years, or will play an increasing role in future research, are covered.  This 
paper reviews the empirical literature on the choice of exchange rate regime. Prominent issues 
include: (i) the discrepancy between declared and actual regime, (ii) the different approaches 
of the exchange regime choice that focus on emerging markets (iii) the critical review of the 
theoretical and emperical literature.  
 From the survey it may be concluded that no empirical regularities regarding the choice of a 
currency regime have emerged yet. 
In predicting exchange rate regime choice, economic theory alone has been proven to be an 
insufficient guide to policymakers. No single theoretical approach seems to have an 
overwhelming victory over another. For example, while some studies find support for the  
importance of the optimum currency area (OCA) approach, others do not. The same is true 
when using approaches from the trade-off and the bipolar theories.   
In essence, the choice of an exchange rate regime is not straightforward and to be sure, there 
will be continuous revisions of theories and empirical results. 
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Source : Revised System for the Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements.IMF Working 
Paper 2009.WP/09/211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Appendix II : Table-2 Alternative classifications 
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